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to become Federal Judge for the District of Kentucky, which position he filed with ability until his death, Janiuary 25,. 1835..
In view of the fact that Judge Boyle was Chief Justice, during
this assault upon the judiciary, and stood with Spartan devotion to
the cause through that memorable struggle, I feel that I cannot conclude this paper with anything more appropriate than the splendid
and deserved eulogy which Judge George Robertson, himself an
august and serene personality, once paid to Judge Boyle:
"As a .lawyer, he was candid, consciencious and faithful; as a
statesman, honest, disinterested and patriotic; as a judge, pure, impartial and enlightened; as a citizen, upright, just and faultless;
as a neighbor, kind, affable and condescending; as a man, chaste,
modest and benignant; as a husband, most constant, affectionate and
devoted."

REFORMATION OF THE JURY SYSTEM
By Lewis MlcQuown.*

In an able and interesting addresst on "Reform in Criminal
Procedure," delivered by Judge Kerr before the Kentucky Circuit
Judges' Association, he urges that the law be changed so that in
trials, in criminal cases, the juries shall only be required to pass upon
the guilt of the accused, and that the judges be authorized to fix the
punishment. He illustrates and enforces this contention by reference
to numerous trials, .where manifest injustice resulted from verdicts in
which the punishment, fixed by the jury, was either excessive or inadequate. A system which provided these inequalities, he urges,
should be changed.
Judge Kerr, at the close of his address, correctly and forcibly
points out the cause of the inequalities in these verdicts:-.
"The great. trouble with most juries is that the individual
members, who -compose it, resolve themselves into. a law unto them
.Ky.
-tJlasgoW,
tKentucky Law Journal, Vol. VI, No. 2. p. 107.
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selves, and they not only determine the guilt or innocence, the punishment to be inflicted, but the righteousness of the law."
This is doubtless true; and thus they deal with the guilt of the
accused, in the same manner, and upon the same considerations,
as in fixing the punishment. If they are opposed to the law, hung
juries, or verdicts of not guilty, often result, whereas the same
quantum of evidence, in a case where they favor the enforcement
of the law, will produce a conviction. So that it would seem that
all the objections against the power to fix punishment by juries
applies, with equal force, to their passing upon the guilt or innocence of the accused. The law which the court has given them, in
many instances, is regarded as only "a scrap of paper," and the
verdict is based upon the law evolved by them in the jury room.
If, however, juries are to be shorn of the power to fix punishment,
because they abuse it, in some cases, if, in like manner, this power
to pass upon the guilt of the accused is abused, must they be dispensed with altogether?
If Judge Kerr is correct in the views advanced, would the remedy he offers cure the evil? That an experienced judge is better
able than a jury to fix an adequate and just punishment, will be
denied by few persons familiar with judicial procedure. But it
will be well for those who seek to invest the judges with this power
to carefully consider the consequences, which may result from the
change. I-To pronounce a sentence of death, in pursuance to a verdict by a judge, is an unpleasant duty; but when the judge has the
discretion to choose between life and death, a heavy responsibility
is imposed. In the first instance, the jury has declared the penalty,
and has the responsibility, but, in the last, it rests entirely upon the
judge. It is questionable whether the extreme penalty would be
as often imposed by the judge as it is now by the juries. Before
service, the jurors are asked whether they are opposed to, or have
conscientious scruples, against the infliction of capital punishment.
But when" and where, and by whom, will the judges be interrogated
upon this vitally important but extremely delicate question?
Wh'en we conWider that juries have, been allowed, to fix the
punishmefit so long, if the power to do so should be taken from
them and vested in the judges, this would, or might, in some meas-

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
ure, engender resentment against the law and the courts, and have
a tendency to cause hung juries, or verdicts of not guilty. Not
knowing what punishment the judge would fix, in many instances,
juries might refuse to find a verdict of guilty. They might be
.willing to find a verdict of guilty, in a murder case, and yet would
not consent to the death penalty. So as to manslaughter, where
there is a wide margin between the highest and lowest *penalty.
If the jury suspected that the judge would impose the maximum
term, and they believed that only the minimum punishment should
be given, in such cases convictions would be rare.
W'hat. is the remedy for these evils, -real or conjectural? It
will certainly, in a measure, be found in raising the standard of
qualification for jurors, and in changing the mode of their selection. This will not eliminate all the evils that inhere in the system, but it is believed will contribute largely to that end.
The system of selecting jurors which prevailed before -the introduction of the '.'wheel" furnished a higher class of citizens than
we see in the jury box today. The commissioners selected one hundred names of men"free from all legal exceptions, of fair character, and approved integrity, of sound judgment and well informed."
From this list thirty were selected by- lot to compose the petit
juries. It was an easy task for the commissioners, to select these
names from personal acquaintance. In selecting thirty of these by
lot it was morally certain that each' would. possess the required
qualification.
But under the present system, it seems impracticable, if not
impossible, to obtain the same class of citizens. The :commissioners
are required to select the- names from the assessor's book. This
seems to be mandatory, and, no.doubt, impressed with this idea, the
commissioners assume that if the names appear on the book, it is
evidence 'of sufficient qualification. In counties having a small
population, where only 125 names are required, the commissioners may be personally .acquainted with 'the persons selected. But
in the more populous counties, where from 500 to 2,000 names are
required, it seems impossible to do more 'than take many of them
from the book, and no doubt this is the usual practice. Where
one' or two thousand names are selectedi can the commissioners
fairly and truthfully' certify to the court that these persons are
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qualified under the law? If they do so, it seems unbelievable. The
law contemplates that the commissioners should, have knowledge
as to the qualification. In selecting one or two thousand this is
impracticable, if not impossible. Hence the jury boxes contain
many disqualified jurors. The wonder is there are not more.
Under the former system, the statute required a higher standard than the present la* prescribes. Now it is "intelligent, sober,
discreet and impartial citizens." Under the former law, the qualification was "free from all legal exceptions, of fair character and
approved integrity, of sound judgment and well informed."
A
juror may be intelligent, sober and discreet, but has he character,
integrity and sound judgment? Neither is required under the
present law. A juror may be qualified without either.
It seems clear that many of the mistakes, and much of the injustice, of which Judge Kerr complains might, or would be corrected, if the standard for jurors was raised, and the mode of their
selection changed. This subject is certainly worthy of the careful
consideration of legislators, as well as of the bench and bar of the
Commonwealth, for no important legal reform can ever be accomplished except by the efforts of those engaged in the administration of the law. The profession is indebted to Judge Kerr for calling attention to the miscarriage of justice under the present system.

